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A lack of concerted action on the part of local authorities and their
citizens to respond to climate change is argued to arise partly
from a poor relationship between the two. Meanwhile, local
authorities could have a signiﬁcant impact on community-wide
levels of greenhouse gas emissions because of their inﬂuence over
many other actors, but have had limited success with orthodox
voluntary behaviour change methods and hold back from stricter
behaviour change interventions. Citizen participation may offer an
effective means of improving understanding between citizens and
government concerning climate change and, because it is inherently
a dialogue, avoids many of the pitfalls of more orthodox attempts to
effect behaviour change. Participatory budgeting is a form of citizen
participation which seems well suited to the task in being
quantitative, drawing a diverse audience and, when successfully
run, engendering conﬁdence amongst authority stakeholders. A
variant of it, participatory emissions budgeting, would introduce the
issue of climate change in a way that required citizens to trade off
greenhouse gas emissions with wider policy goals. It may help
citizens to appreciate the nature of the challenge and the role of
local government in responding; this may in turn provide authority
stakeholders with increased conﬁdence in the scope to implement
pro-environmental agendas without meeting signiﬁcant resistance.
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There is now overwhelming scientiﬁc consensus that anthropogenic climate change poses very
signiﬁcant threats to humankind’s future life on earth (Pittock, 2009). Estimates vary as to the global
average temperature rise that can be endured and the maximal concentration of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere consistent with that rise (Rockstro¨m et al., 2009) but there is little disagreement
amongst those who accept the reality of anthropogenic climate change that very major changes are
needed in human behaviour in order to manage the risk.
This paper discusses the limited response to climate change on the part of local government and
citizens alike and explores the possibility of using citizen participation (a tool normally employed to
support public decision making) to overcome the apparent stasis.2. Climate change, local government and citizens
2.1. National government response to climate change
The UK has led national governments in establishing its 2008 Climate Change Act (UK
Government, 2008) which commits the government to reducing emissions of most greenhouse
gases to 20 per cent of 1990 levels by 2050, with intermediate targets for 2025. Whether these
targets are sufﬁciently exacting or not, they underline the need for dramatic change. And this
prompts the question of where the change will come from.
The change could take many forms and, in connection with this, Malone (2009) analyses
arguments concerning climate change across a range of media, identifying 11 broad ‘‘families’’, six of
which relate to responding in various ways, with themes that range from nurturing greater
international agreement, via technical advances, to preparing for the need to adapt. The variety of
areas in which change is argued for helpfully demonstrates the roles of both individual actors
(consumers and producers) and institutions. Government, in particular, is seen as the source of
treaties and trading systems designed to manage down emissions. But it can also be the facilitator of
change at the individual level by inﬂuencing the actions of individuals and organisations. So, if the
material consulted by Malone is representative, government has a major role to play, a point
emphasised by the UK government itself in its Carbon Plan: ‘‘While the public sector represents only
around 3% of the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions, it has a responsibility to lead the way in reducing
them’’ (UK Government, 2011, p. 54).
2.2. Potential role of local authorities
In the case of local authorities in particular, there seems considerable potential. They can in the
ﬁrst instance achieve reductions of greenhouse gas emissions emanating from their ‘‘own estate and
operations’’ as the now defunct National Indicator 185 phrased it (Department of Energy and Climate
Change, 2011). They have much to gain from reducing these emissions, both in terms of saving
money (through reduced energy costs) and through reduced contributions as part of the CRC
arrangements that attach a penalty to each tonne of greenhouse gases (GHG) emitted (Environment
Agency, 2010). It seems reasonable to suppose that ﬁnancial and other incentives for local authorities to
reduce their footprints will only increase as secondary legislation is enacted to follow the Climate
Change Act.
Local authorities can additionally employ a range of mechanisms to reduce the emissions of
citizens and organisations based in their areas.
‘‘The capacity [of a local authority] to inﬂuence carbon emissions derives from the fact that virtually
every activity by a local authority will have some sort of impact on carbon emissions—either directly
or through the inﬂuence or control it exerts on another person or organisation. And in many cases,
it is only local authorities who carry out these activities. A local authority can therefore potentially
take action to ensure that such inﬂuence is positive and beneﬁcial, principally through integrating
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Sustainable Energy, 2007, p. 12).
There are numerous areas of inﬂuence available to local authorities. The Department for Business,
Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (2007) offers eight categories external to the council’s own estate and
operations: environment, planning, housing, transport, schools and education, social care, economic
development and regeneration, and energy advice. And local authorities have considerable powers at
their disposal in terms of regulation, charging, guidance/marketing and investment (current ﬁnancial
constraints notwithstanding) as recognised in the memorandum of understanding signed by the
Department of Energy and Climate Change and the Local Government Group (since renamed Local
Government Association) (Local Government Group & Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011).
These powers are set to increase in light of the granting to local authorities of a general power of
competence under the Localism Act 2011 (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011a).
2.3. Potential inﬂuence of local authorities
A number of assumptions need to be made in order to arrive at an estimate of the possible overall
impact of local authority interventions aimed at mitigating climate change. One attempt, made in
preparation for the introduction of National Indicator 186 (per capita reduction in CO2 emissions in
the local authority area), reached the following conclusion.
‘‘The results show that many LAs in England could expect to achieve between 11% and 13%
reduction in emissions compared to 2004 by 2010 and between 19% and 23% compared with
2004 emissions by 2020’’ (AEA Technology plc, 2008, p. 55).
Notwithstanding the uncertainties underlying these projections (and the fact that they relate only to
CO2 rather than the full basket of greenhouse gases), the contrast between the scale of these numbers
and the three per cent quoted in the Carbon Plan helps to show that, though the local government sector
may not itself be responsible for a large proportion of overall emissions, it appears to have the potential
greatly to reduce emissions in general because of its inﬂuence over other actors.
This analysis merits further scrutiny because of the types of intervention that are considered in the
analysis. In the report, three categories are formally identiﬁed on the basis of jurisdiction, ranging from
measures that rest wholly with central government1 (but that would affect community-level emissions),
through national measures ‘‘but can be improved in performance with inﬂuence by LAs’’ (AEA Technology
plc, 2008, p. 36), to measures arising at the local level. This helps to emphasise the ability of the local
authority sector both to initiate activity itself and to have a signiﬁcant effect upon the impact achieved
by central government initiatives. More interesting, though, is the diversity amongst the measures
investigated in terms of how the change might come about. Included in the list are regulatory measures,
ﬁnancial incentives (both those promising rebates and those threatening penalties), educational and
marketing interventions; this collection in effect therefore spans the range within an authority’s power.
What is not discussed (and this, in fairness, lies outside the scope of the report) is whether the bundle of
measures presented can be expected to meet with general acceptance when imposed upon or
implemented amongst various actors including citizens, businesses and other types of organisation.
2.4. Limited local authority action
This question of acceptability is of crucial importance because, despite the gravity of the threat of
climate change and the considerable inﬂuence that local authorities appear to have, they are not yet
responding as they might. Three quarters of English local authorities have not instituted a target to
reduce carbon emissions across their area by 2020; of those that have, only a quarter have set a
target of or above 40 per cent, the amount recommended by the Committee on Climate Change1 For this reason, the quoted ﬁgures probably overstate what the local authority sector could achieve through its own
interventions.
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evidence of avoidance of the challenge of climate change, the local government sector can be argued
to be underperforming.
There may be several reasons for this apparent lack of action amongst the bulk of authorities.
Research conducted from the perspective of the transport sector in particular concluded the following:
‘‘Key drivers [for action on climate change] identiﬁed during the study included:(De
grestrong political leadership providing high-level support and direction;
 working towards adopted commitments and targets;
 commitment from council ofﬁcers; and
 community support.Challenges and barriers which emerged included: climate change scepticism amongst councillors and the community;
 competing and conﬂicting objectives such as cutting carbon in the face of economic growth; and
 resource pressures and reduced budgets’’ (Atkins, 2010, p. 2).
The lists demonstrate how easy it is for progress to be frustrated. At present, British local
authorities are continuing to deal with a signiﬁcant reduction in resources over the past two years
which has forced them to make difﬁcult decisions about cutting services; given this, a sizeable
proportion have set climate change as an issue to one side (Scott, 2011). And though the research by
AEA Technology Ltd. (2008) lists a range of possible interventions, their ﬁnancial and political
deliverability is not addressed. Ranged against the local authority keen to effect reductions is a series
of obstacles, many of them external: the majority of emissions arise from decisions of private actors
and, to the extent that these decisions are regulated, the regulation comes from central government.
Whilst the Localism Act provides some new powers to local authorities, it does not confer the
capacity to raise local taxes, thereby depriving the motivated authority of a key policy lever on the
one hand, and the means to generate revenue that could pay for mitigation measures on the other.
A further reason for limited action to date may be the lack of compelling incentives. Local
authorities’ existing duties with respect to climate change are limited: a survey of requirements
imposed on local authorities by central government departments, conducted as part of the current
administration’s localism and decentralisation agenda, reveals only six which explicitly mention
climate change or greenhouse gases, from a total of nearly 1300.2 Whilst this of course does not
constitute a comprehensive investigation of the burden placed on local authorities by central
government in respect of climate change, it nonetheless provides a sense of relative weight. And this
may help to explain the campaign led by the non-governmental organisation Friends of the Earth
during the development of the Energy Bill (now Energy Act 2011) for the imposition of carbon
budgets on local authorities (Friends of the Earth, 2010).
It is important too to consider a wider context for the performance of local authorities. The pure
science of climate change and the consequent imperatives for action can be seen as part of a ‘‘story-
line’’ (Brand and Thomas, 2005) in which they feature to a greater or lesser extent in a given setting,
reﬂecting the balance of power amongst relevant actors and their motivations. Whether or not a
local authority acts as it might in response will not necessarily be a matter of hard fact but more the
prevailing status of environmental problems in the wider social discourse.
2.5. Relations between authority stakeholders and citizens
Thus there are strong and understandable ﬁnancial, procedural and social reasons for the limited
degree of action to date, but these do not explain the very signiﬁcant range of performance across2 Two databases of duties placed on local authorities by central government departments are available online
partment for Communities and Local Government, 2011b); these were searched for references to climate change,
enhouse gas and associated terms.
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the varying extent to which local authorities experience problems such as trafﬁc congestion or poor
air quality which can be linked to climate change. It is probably also a function of the relationship
between council ofﬁcers, members and constituents, a recurring theme in the ﬁndings of Atkins
(2010). For example, its report mentions a public consultation conducted in York in which citizens
placed the economy and quality of life above other considerations including climate change; this
sentiment may be common but councillors in some areas would formulate policy in line with it
whereas others may be prepared to overrule it.
It is well established that politicians respond to their perceptions of public opinion (for example
Soroka and Wlezien, 2005). The risk is that, because citizens and businesses are not yet ready to
make major changes in response to climate change (see Section 2.6), authorities themselves hold
back, for fear of prompting a backlash. Meanwhile, citizens may fall back on the relative inaction of
political institutions as grounds for not themselves making changes (Ho¨ppner and Whitmarsh,
2010). This vicious circle, already complex, is further complicated by the involvement of the media,
whose interventions can serve to concentrate or distort the views of citizens, thereby inﬂuencing the
actions of government disproportionately or inappropriately (Page, 1996).
The fear of a backlash on the part of local authorities may be justiﬁed. Citizen opinion of
politicians tends to be poor and citizens’ evaluation of local authority performance can be volatile
(e.g. Ipsos MORI, 2009). This seems a difﬁcult position from which to attempt to effect dramatic,
all-encompassing change. But there is also the possibility that politicians have an inaccurate
understanding of citizen opinion, possibly because of a range of biases in play (Bro¨g, 2000). They may
therefore be more fearful of a negative response to policy changes than they need be. And climate
change scepticism is a further concern: if an inﬂuential segment of any of the groups – members,
ofﬁcers or constituents – argues against the need for signiﬁcant change in response to climate
change, this introduces a further obstacle to progress.
2.6. Citizen attitudes to climate change
Awareness of climate change as a phenomenon amongst UK citizens is reasonably high though
this is not supported by an equally extensive knowledge of its likely impacts (Ho¨ppner and
Whitmarsh, 2010). Similarly, citizens are familiar with many of the behaviour changes that may be
necessary to mitigate climate change but their readiness to make them varies, with car use, for
example, identiﬁed as an area of relatively great resistance to change (Marsden and King, 2009). It
could be said that citizens have not yet engaged with climate change.
It is possible to characterise this current position of citizens as a failure in communication and/or
leadership on the part of government; it is equally possible to say that citizen opinion shifts slowly
and that the current position is to be expected given the magnitude of change needed. But a
requirement imposed by the Climate Change Act to reduce emissions by 50 per cent against 1990
levels by 2025 makes the identiﬁcation of the correct explanation somewhat academic: citizen
behaviour needs to change greatly. Economic and/or regulatory measures may deliver the bulk of
this change but a shift in citizen attitudes seems necessary in order either to foster additional
behaviour change beyond that which economic/regulatory measures produce, to smooth the way to
the enforced change, or to do both.
As with the local authority sector, though, it is helpful to look at the role of the citizens in a wider
context. The degree to which climate change will matter to them is a function of its status in the discourse
as well as the attributes of the individuals themselves. That a proportion of citizens are concerned about
and responding to climate change is not in doubt; but they do not represent the majority. Of the many
existing typologies that may help to explain this, one is the ‘‘group-grid cultural theory’’ developed by
Mary Douglas (e.g. Douglas et al., 2003) which classiﬁes individuals according to the nature of their social
environment including their relationship with the prevailing power structures, and which can be used to
offer some insight into their likely response to climate change. Of the four categories set out in the theory,
the egalitariansmight be thought of as the already active. In contrast, the individualistic type is likely to be
sceptical about the phenomenon, the fatalistic type will rationally conclude that action is useless, whereas
the hierarchical type will not see the problem as requiring an individual response. That is, only one of the
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pattern emerging if others were applied.
2.7. Changing citizen attitudes and behaviour
Much effort has been expended on promoting attitudinal and behaviour change amongst citizens
with respect to climate change. Regulation and ﬁnancial penalties have been applied to only a
limited extent so far, and there has been experience of strong opposition to some such measures,
including the carbon tax now adopted in Australia (BBC, 2011). Instead, there appears to date a
greater emphasis on ﬁnancial incentives (e.g. discounts on energy-efﬁcient equipment) and on
communication. Again, these measures can be characterised as either successful or unsuccessful
depending on expectations concerning impact. With respect to communication, research has cast
doubt on whether mainstream methods such as advertising will succeed on their own (e.g. Staats
et al., 1996). In addition, the assumption that citizens need only to understand climate change in
order to make the transition in terms of attitude and behaviour (the Public Understanding of Science
doctrine) has fallen from favour (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004).
These developments have led to increased interest in social marketing as a tool of change. It too,
though, has its detractors where climate change is concerned. Corner and Randall (2011) conclude
that climate change is not suited to treatment using ‘‘classical’’ social marketing for several reasons.
First, successful social marketing depends on tailoring messages/interventions to the values of the
audience; this can only work in the case of climate change if those values are congruent with the
changes necessary, which seems not to be the case, at least at present. Second, one of the pillars of
social marketing theory – that small changes will lead to large changes – may not apply in the
context of climate change: small changes such as recycling more are often easy to make within
an individual’s value system whereas the large changes required (such as giving up air travel) may be
at odds with it. Third, social marketing tends to emphasise individual difference through the
segmentation process that is used to tailor messages. But climate change is a collective problem
requiring collective solutions, including those which draw on high social capital. In particular, Corner
and Randall conclude that successful action concerning climate change may therefore need to take
the form of communication with groups rather than individuals.
2.8. Discussion
The previous section sets out an argument that standard approaches to effecting behaviour
change on the part of citizens may have inherent limitations and this may be a more convincing
argument for their slight impact so far than that such approaches have not been used in sufﬁcient
volume. There is the further issue that citizens may have more than one reason for resisting standard
approaches as paternalistic (see Section 3.2).
If citizen attitudes and behaviour with respect to climate change are not changing quickly enough
in response to ‘‘classical’’ attempts on the part of government to alter them, and if this lack of
progress is causing government to hold back, there appears to be an argument for trying different
approaches. Further, if Corner and Randall (2011) are right that communicating at the group level
may work better than engaging with individuals, such a new approach might best be in some sense
collective. Reﬂecting all these points, the potential role of citizen participation is discussed below in
Section 3.3. The potential role of citizen participation in tackling climate change
3.1. Deﬁnition
Citizen participation in public decision making is diverse and a wide range of terms is in use to
describe its variants. For the purposes of this discussion, it is helpful to adopt the deﬁnition offered
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involvement, by the public (either individuals or organisations), to inﬂuence government decisions/
action/policy. So, for clarity, this deﬁnition excludes participating in ballots to elect politicians,
participating in the decision-making processes of non-public bodies (e.g. works councils), and
participating in groups or activities with an essentially social or community focus.
3.2. Why use citizen participation to address climate change?
At ﬁrst sight, there appears an incongruity between a problem that has been deﬁned as one of
attitude and behaviour (both individual and institutional), and a set of methods intended to contribute to
public decision making. Whilst possible limitations of orthodox tools to foster behaviour change have
been discussed in Section 2.7, there remains a need to justify the use of citizen participation to achieve
the same goal.
The primary justiﬁcation lies in the nature of communication between government and citizen.
Most orthodox behaviour change methods, however well disguised, consist of efforts on the part of
the authority to make the citizen adopt a way of behaving. This can be seen as paternalistic by
citizens and may provoke a negative response, especially if the authority’s own behaviour does not
appear unimpeachable (Halpern et al., 2004). In contrast with this ‘‘top-down’’ method, properly-
conducted citizen participation creates a more balanced dialogue between authority and citizen,
reducing the likelihood of resistance (Rowe et al., 2008). It can also result in satisfaction amongst
participants (International Association for Public Participation, 2009) and elected members (Kathlene
and Martin, 1991).
Connected to this point is the fact that both authority and citizen have a role to play in mitigating
climate change. Orthodox behaviour change methods tend to concentrate attention only on the
citizen’s role, the implication being that the authority’s role is to be discussed elsewhere, if at all. This
creates a further asymmetry that could lead to resentment. There is a positive converse to this:
according to the theory of social proof, one actor is likelier to ‘‘do her/his bit’’ if others are seen to be
doing theirs (Aronson, 2010).
A ﬁnal reason for using citizen participation is that, when asked, citizens typically say they wish
to be more involved in public decision making (Ipsos MORI, 2010). Leaving aside possible
inconsistencies between this stated desire and actual behaviour in response to offers of involvement,
this position is striking given that, in contrast, citizens would not normally be expected to say that
they wanted government to spend more time and money trying to change their behaviour.
Thus the uneasy relationship between citizens and government and the limited potential of
‘‘classical’’ communication may offer a dual justiﬁcation for employing citizen participation as a
means of accelerating progress in climate change mitigation. Bringing citizens into the governmental
decision-making process may help to modify citizen attitudes and behaviour; it may also help to
overcome some of the barriers seen as obstructing authorities themselves in addressing climate
change.
3.3. Possible difﬁculties with using citizen participation
The previous section began with the expression of doubt about the match between the method
(citizen participation) and the objective (institutional and individual behaviour change). In
particular, there is no guarantee that citizen participation will lead directly to actions or events
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In certain cases, the two could be explicitly linked (for
example by involving citizens in the selection of mitigation methods, as discussed in Section 6.2), but
citizen participation is a tool that can be applied very widely and there is nothing intrinsically pro-
environmental about it. Therefore, for citizen participation to be a suitable intervention for tackling
climate change, it is very important that it be appropriately speciﬁed.
Such a speciﬁcation could help to ensure that the subject matter and/or method were such as to
promote climate change mitigation, but there is again no guarantee that citizens, given a free hand,
would select pro-environmental measures since, as discussed in Section 2.6, willingness to adopt
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is weak. To some extent this may arise from a general human tendency to make sub-optimal
decisions, cited by various authors as evidence against the use of citizen participation (Chong and
Druckman, 2007; Marshall and Tse, 2010; Shaﬁr and LeBoeuf, 2002).
A further reason for doubting the suitability of citizen participation is that it is not automatically
successful and can, in certain circumstances, lead to a worsening of relations between authority and
citizen, in the case of climate change thereby reducing rather than increasing the probability of an
upswing in mitigation efforts. This risk can be managed to an extent through careful process design
but it arises largely from prior events and circumstantial factors such as the institutional (Section 2.4)
and social (Section 2.6) context. There is a further risk that an individual or group will hijack a citizen
participation process; again, good design can help but it cannot entirely neutralise the risk.4. Identifying a suitable form of citizen participation
4.1. Introduction
Where citizen participation takes place, a question is typically being addressed and a method (or
set of methods) used to address it. In this section, the formulation of an appropriate question is
discussed; the characteristics of that question are then used as the basis for identifying a suitable
citizen participation method.4.2. Question deﬁnition
The natural starting point in deﬁning a suitable question or problem is the impasse identiﬁed in
Section 2. A question could be formulated along the following lines: ‘‘what should government and
citizens do to accelerate action to counteract climate change?’’
There have been citizen participation exercises following this general line. For example, in World
Wide Views on Climate Change (Bedsted and Klu¨ver, 2009), citizens from 38 nations deliberated on
climate change in advance of the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen. Their conclusions were distilled
into nine key messages which are consistent with much that has been written about how best to
respond to climate change. Those messages, though, tend to lack speciﬁc prescriptions and were
drawn up as if in ignorance of the policy context in which states must act. The lack of speciﬁcity is
likely to have arisen from the need to aggregate across a large number of contributions; this is a
problem common to all citizen participation exercises that are not designed to produce a deﬁnitive
answer (i.e. that do not include a well-deﬁned means of aggregating preferences). A perhaps more
signiﬁcant issue is the absence of any acknowledgement of policy realism: it is one thing to stipulate
that certain states should reduce emissions ‘‘25–40% or more by 2020’’ (Bedsted and Klu¨ver, 2009, p. 4);
it is another to display an appreciation of the competing pressures faced by governments and of the
practical business of instituting and pursuing such a target, including the implications for individual
citizens. Government stakeholders might look at these conclusions and think them laudable but feel the
conclusions do not demonstrate much about the likely response on the part of citizens (in particular, the
participants themselves) and institutions if those recommendations were unquestioningly implemented.
In fairness to the organisers of the exercise discussed above, a question as broad as how to
accelerate action on climate change is almost bound to produce platitudes. More to the point, given
that the link in this discussion between the proposed intervention (citizen participation) and the
desired outcome (more pro-environmental programmes and behaviours) is indirect, a question based
on the desired outcome is not automatically the optimal choice. In addition to the risk that it will
produce quite bland results, a distinct concern is that the explicit mention of climate change will bias
participation. Where citizens are free to decide whether to take part, the use of the term will
probably draw environmentally-motivated individuals more than those less interested in the topic
(in line with evidence elsewhere that propensity to participate is related to personal interest in
the theme, e.g. Gaskell (2004)). Use of the term may also elicit exaggerated pro-environmental
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seem possible to achieve the desired outcome by excluding climate change from the question
completely; instead, climate change perhaps needs to feature implicitly.
In order that the question can be used in multiple settings, it is necessary that it be generic in
form. Thus a question about a particular intervention (whether to adopt or reject nuclear power, for
example) or location (where to build a piece of infrastructure, for example) would not be suitable as
its application would be limited to a particular setting/circumstance or one very like it.
To summarise, the above discussion indicates the following: the question must require of participants that they arrive at a ﬁrm answer as opposed to vague
policy prescriptions; it must realistically address trade-offs between the risks of climate change and competing policy
demands; it should not mention climate change explicitly;
 it must be transferable in spatial and temporal terms.
This suggests that the question should be of the form ‘‘which measures should we implement?’’
Such a question would need to be framed by some well-deﬁned constraints relating to climate
change and one or more other policy indicators in order that citizens’ deliberations displayed the
necessary degree of realism.
4.2.1. Relevant characteristics of the question
As it was deﬁned in Section 4.2, the question to be posed to citizens has the following
characteristics likely to inform the selection of a method of citizen participation: It is inherently quantitative in character: for trade-offs to be dealt with, some sense of relative
magnitude of impact across dimensions is essential. In the case of climate change in particular,
the speciﬁc targets brought forward by the Climate Change Act imply a need for similarly exact
numbers at the local authority level. It has a comparative component: the question will, through the imposition of constraints, require
citizens to weigh up impacts across more than one indicator in order to arrive at a chosen way
forward. In order that this convinces elected members, it may be desirable for this comparison to
be methodical to ensure consistency. It should arrive at a conclusion which the sponsoring authority could implement: local authority
stakeholders are likely to be sceptical of a mechanism which produces only general statements of
policy direction. The constraints require explanation: the provision of some information is essential—citizens are
almost certain not to have a full understanding of the greenhouse gas emissions associated with
a given intervention and may well not know a great deal about greenhouse gases and their
potential contribution to climate change.
4.3. Categorising citizen participation forms
There are numerous taxonomies of citizen participation forms (Arnstein, 1969; Beetham et al., 2008;
Brodie et al., 2009; Sprain, 2008; Steenbergen et al., 2003). Most of these are based on relationships of
power and/or the impact of participation on the citizen. More relevant to this discussion is the work of
Rowe and Frewer (2005), which establishes a typology based on methodological characteristics.
Rowe and Frewer identify six ‘‘key mechanism variables’’: participant selection method;
facilitation of information elicitation; response mode; information input; medium of information
transfer; and facilitation of aggregation. They then divide citizen participation methods into three
categories (communication, consultation and participation) and subdivide these categories to reﬂect
signiﬁcant differences of character across methods. Each of these subdivisions is then characterised
by its ‘‘level’’ against the six key mechanism variables.
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For the purposes of ﬁnding a method that suits the question deﬁned in Section 4.2, two
subdivisions of Rowe and Frewer’s participation category appear most relevant. Their participation
types 3 and 4 share the following attributes: Open response mode—allow free contribution rather than limiting participants to choosing from
a ﬁxed set of options. Flexible information—participants are not limited to a pre-set quantity of information.
 Face-to-face—citizens gather to participate.
 Structured aggregation—the views of participants are brought together according to a pre-
arranged method.
Participation Types 3 and 4 differ as follows: Type 3 methods involve a controlled (i.e. recruited) set of participants whilst Type 4 methods are
open to all. Type 3 methods involve ‘‘facilitated elicitation’’ (the presence of an individual who attempts to
ensure that the views of all present are heard) whereas Type 4 methods do not.
Rowe and Frewer do not claim that they are working with an exhaustive list of methods so it is
possible that certain types of citizen participation would straddle the categories/types they have
deﬁned. In particular, participatory budgeting (PB) does not feature in their list. This may be because
PB is often characterised more as an empowerment tool rather than a decision-making method, but
it is nonetheless an interesting omission given its prevalence (see Section 5).
4.4.1. Discussion
Looking at the key mechanism variables in turn: For Rowe and Frewer, the issue of open/closed response mode relates to maximising relevant
information obtained from participants: a ﬁxed list of options limits participants to voicing their
views on those options; in contrast, the freedom to develop new ideas is likely to draw more from
them. If decision quality were the primary consideration, open response would seem the obvious
candidate. Given the indirect goals of this exercise, though, this attribute may seem less
important. That said, it is strongly argued in the literature on deliberative democracy that
participants should have the freedom to contribute to the list of options (e.g. Christiano, 1996)
and there is also reason to think that participants’ satisfaction with a process of citizen
participation will be enhanced by the ability to make such contributions. Given the attributes of the question that has been deﬁned, the capacity to seek information
ﬂexibly about options and their attributes appears essential; it seems unlikely that a sufﬁciently
comprehensive information set could otherwise be prepared in advance that would not be overly
burdensome for participants to assimilate. There is an ongoing debate on the need for citizen participation to take place face-to-face.
Advocates of e-participation argue that carefully managed on-line methods can be successful (e.g.
Lowry, 2009) and, by not requiring participants’ presence at a particular place and time, they
obviously have certain advantages over face-to-face methods (though they are also restrictive in
that they require participants to have access to and conﬁdence with the necessary technology).
For the purposes deﬁned here, it appears that a face-to-face method is essential: in order for local
authority stakeholders to be convinced of citizens’ readiness to accept a more pro-environmental
programme, it seems very important that they witness for themselves the interaction between
participants. There is also a case for making sure that citizens participate in the presence of
authority stakeholders as a means of building trust. The need for structured aggregation leads directly on from the requirement for the citizen
participation process to lead to a single answer.
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that could be put on this point, the most relevant is from credibility: if the process is open to any
citizen, this makes it much less susceptible than a selective process to complaints of unfairness or
manipulation. In differentiating between facilitated and unfacilitated methods, Rowe and Frewer may be guilty of
simpliﬁcation. Here, the work of Stirling (2005) elucidates. He offers a distinction between ‘‘opening
up’’ (where the task is to explore a problem without necessarily aiming for a ﬁrm conclusion) and
‘‘closing down’’ (where an answer is sought). Facilitated elicitation (of information) may well be
necessary in ‘‘opening up’’ settings in order to ensure that the outcome of the exercise reﬂects the views
of all participants. Its contribution is subtler in ‘‘closing down’’ settings where there exists a robust
means of preference elicitation (i.e. voting): here, facilitated elicitation is not required to establish
participants’ preferences but it may nonetheless prove valuable by making explicit the range of
participants’ opinions, with the possible consequence that some adjustments of position take place. It
could also be useful in light of the need, identiﬁed in this section, to provide information ﬂexibly to
participants—a facilitator could both elicit information and meet information needs.4.5. A shortlist of methods
The discussion in Section 4.4 appears, on balance, to favour methods conforming to Rowe and Frewer’s
participation type 4—the argument in favour of uncontrolled selection is strong, whilst the issue of
facilitated elicitation is less conclusive. The example of type 4 participation given by Rowe and Frewer is a
town meeting following the New England model and including voting. Such town meetings enjoy some
legislative and budgetary power in relevant American states (Williamson and Fung, 2004) so they are not
automatically transferable to the UK setting. This power is a signiﬁcant attribute in that the meeting’s
decisions are enacted, in contrast to the many forms of citizen participation whose outcomes are used to a
greater or lesser extent by politicians who remain in control of the ultimate decision.
To the example of townmeetings could be added participatory budgeting (described more fully in
Section 5) which also conforms to the attributes of participation type 4. And, though it is not a
widely-recognised citizen participation method, participatory multi-criteria analysis (PMCA)
(Stirling, 2006) could be designed to satisfy the same operational principles. PMCA involves citizens
in a process of scoring options against a set of agreed criteria, then using weights to distil each
option’s performance into a single score in order to arrive at a preferred option.
It may in fact be helpful to characterise participatory budgeting (PB) and PMCA as special,
quantitative cases of the town meeting. Town meetings arrive at policy and budgetary decisions
through debate and voting. Similarly, PB arrives at decisions through voting but these relate to the
allocation of budget to activities so its scope is somewhat more narrowly deﬁned; it is, in effect, the
quantitative component of the town meeting. PMCA could equally be used to arrive at binding
decisions concerning policy, budget or both provided the sponsoring authority imbued it with the
necessary status in the decision-making process.
The discussion in Section 4.4 of attributes of the question to put to citizens suggests that PMCA
might be a suitable decision-support tool—it is a quantitative technique and is explicitly designed to
handle trade-offs between competing priorities as a way of moving towards a single answer. And
multi-criteria analysis has been used in settings involving citizens on various occasions. The
problems tackled have tended to be quite speciﬁc, typically centreing on a particular location or the
search for the optimal way of implementing a pre-deﬁned intervention. Participant numbers have
tended to be controlled (perhaps by adopting the citizens’ jury model—Smith and Wales, 1999). Or,
where access to the overall participation exercise is open, citizens may not be included in the setting
of weights or detailed scoring (Laniado et al., 2010, p. 6). This is to some extent understandable, as
multi-criteria analysis is ordinarily a quite demanding process in cognitive terms and the management
effort required might become excessive if there was extensive public interest.
The prospect that PMCA would need to be either subject to controlled selection or in some way
abridged in order for it to operate in an open-access setting casts doubt on its suitability as a method,
despite its evident strengths. Open access has been identiﬁed as a desirable (perhaps essential)
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closed doors might provoke resentment amongst participants, with unwelcome consequences. For
these reasons, participatory budgeting will be the focus of the remainder of this article, on the basis
that it may, overall, be the method best suited to the task.
5. Participatory budgeting
5.1. Introduction
The following is a helpful working deﬁnition of participatory budgeting (PB): ‘‘a mechanism (or
process) through which the population decides on, or contributes to decisions made on, the destination of
all or part of the available public resources’’ (Global Campaign on Urban Governance, 2004, p. 20).
PB is generally agreed to have been ﬁrst practised in Porto Alegre, Brazil in the late 1980s
(Baiocchi, 2003; Wainwright, 2009). It has since been widely exported and examples of it are found
in all continents though, other than in Latin America and so-called developed countries, it tends to
have taken place under the auspices of development organisations (Shah, 2007).
In the UK, varying styles of PB have been used across public bodies, including health providers (Tower
Hamlets Partnership, 2010), police authorities (Church Action on Poverty, 2011b) and ﬁre authorities
(Church Action on Poverty, 2011a). There has been a degree of coordination of the work done in the form
of a pilot project sponsored by the then Ofﬁce of the Deputy Prime Minister, followed more recently by a
national evaluation project (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010). The early phase
of government interest included the establishment of the Participatory Budgeting Unit (PB Unit), a non-
governmental organisation with a speciﬁc mission to roll out PB in order to assist people in poverty in the
UK. It provides a range of practical support to organisations considering or delivering PB.
The PB Unit is part of a more recent partnership promoting PB in England under the current
administration’s banner of Big Society. This initiative, Your Local Budget, has involved the selection of
nine pioneer authorities whose principal challenge is to bring PB ‘‘into the mainstream’’ (with some
discussion continuing as to whether this means whole-authority budgets, the normalisation of the
practice or something else (Bowers and Bunt, 2010)).
Evaluation to date of the PB experience in the UK shows that it has tended to consist for the most
part of ‘‘community chest’’ exercises, with relatively small discretionary sums being made available
to communities to allocate to projects. It has been common for the allocation process to take the
form of a ‘‘beauty parade’’ in which applicants have presented their proposals at a public meeting
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010) prior to a selection process.
5.2. Variation in practice of participatory budgeting
Practice of PB varies considerably across a range of dimensions. The following are some of the
more signiﬁcant in the context of climate change: Directness of inﬂuence—some PB exercises are allocated a sum of money which is spent on the
measures selected, whereas in other exercises the conclusions of the citizens are taken into
account by elected members in reaching their decisions; Whether mainstream—in Porto Alegre, citizens are deciding how a proportion of the city’s overall
budget is spent in contrast with most UK examples where a discretionary sum, distinct from the
main budget, is allocated; Sum of money—there is considerable variation in the relative sums of money being spent through
PB exercises though, even in Porto Alegre (widely hailed as amongst the most progressive
examples), the amount under consideration is still only three per cent of City Hall’s budget
(International Association for Public Participation, 2009); Freedom of choice—certain PB exercises are limited to selecting from a ﬁxed list of options pre-
determined by the sponsoring authority whilst others involve more freedom to determine the
interventions on which money might be spent;
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(Taylor, 2011)), the deliberation process continues for some months and involves a sequence of
meetings and assemblies; UK examples have tended to be considerably quicker with decisions made
over the course of a single meeting. Some methods require presence in person as a qualiﬁcation for
voting whereas others combine a public meeting with the opportunity to vote by post or online; Voting process—practice varies from a show of hands to electronic voting; the preference system
used, though yes/no in the majority of cases, can involve more sophisticated approaches such as
strength of opinion and ranking.
5.3. Impacts of participatory budgeting
From the instrumental perspective, the principal strengths of PB lie in its accessibility and
immediacy: whereas the purpose of other forms of citizen participation (such as citizens’ juries or
deliberative polling) is not automatically transparent to participants and the effect on the policy-
making process can be obscure, there is a clarity about the concept of setting budgets/allocating
funds that places PB apart. Participants have reason to think, in attending, that their contributions
will have an inﬂuence on the policies or measures subsequently pursued by the organising body. This
is quite obviously the case if participants are explicitly allocated a sum of money to spend. Moreover,
PB is viewed as a method that can ‘‘inspire’’ (Blakey, 2008, p. 63) and that perhaps, because of this,
can bring in larger crowds than are seen at more orthodox citizen participation events.
The evidence is that PB attracts a diverse range of participants (SQW et al., 2011) and one that is
therefore perhaps more representative of the group whose views are being sought by the sponsoring
institution than could be expected from more orthodox methods of citizen participation such as
open-access surveys and exhibitions. The consequences of this may be (a) that the political
engagement achieved through PB therefore enjoys a higher status and (b) that the institution’s future
policies better reﬂect the wishes of its constituency than would be the case if a less representative
group had participated in the planning process. Senior authority stakeholders may also be more
persuaded by witnessing a process that has drawn a group other than ‘‘the usual suspects’’.
In fact, in the case of the UK pilots, ‘‘those [elected members] that were involved reported
improvements in relations with their constituents’’ (Department for Communities and Local
Government, 2010, p. 114). This must be taken alongside the ﬁnding that certain elected members
felt sidelined by the PB process, particularly where they were not directly involved in its planning (SQW
et al., 2011). The implication appears to be that PB has the capacity to improve elected members’
connections with their constituents, provided the members are involved from the beginning and do not
object in principle to a process that they see as at odds with representative democracy.
There is a range of evidence concerning the policy and wider social impacts of PB. For example,
though comparisons are not straightforward, it is argued that Porto Alegre has beneﬁted from the PB
process, now having better sewerage, more schools and lower levels of truancy than comparable
cities not using this method (Wainwright, 2009). And, before its reputation was marred by scandal,
the Workers’ Party (which founded the PB process in Porto Alegre) continued to enjoy high levels of
popularity in the city (de Sousa Santos, 1998).
In the UK, the evidence of impacts is mixed but, in Manton, Nottinghamshire (a highly deprived
community in relative terms), a recent evaluation report suggests that residents are taking more
ownership over services being provided in their area (SQW et al., 2011). The same evaluation found
evidence of increased satisfaction with local services across several locations including Manton. The
examples of Porto Alegre and Manton are not necessarily representative because, in both cases, PB has
been part of a wider strategy of building social capital, but they serve to showwhat PB can help to achieve.5.4. Strengths and weaknesses
The discussion in Section 5.3 points out the following strengths of participatory budgeting as a
method of citizen participation:
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exercises. If well-run, it can lead to improved relations between citizens and elected members, and
increased satisfaction with local services on the part of citizens. It can lead to general improvements in service delivery.
Set against these strengths are certain limitations.
Being a budgetary process, PB is constrained in scope to measures involving expenditure, thereby
excluding regulatory and other non-ﬁnancial interventions. In one sense, this is not a weakness, in
that many citizens may think that the budget is ‘‘where the action is’’, but it does mean that they are
not considering the fullest range of possible actions.
A further possible difﬁculty arising from a focus on budget is a disjunction between the amount
spent on an activity and its unit cost. If, for example, a given authority spends the same amount on
education as it does on social care, this conveys nothing about the extent of need and relative cost of
achieving progress in these two sectors, which may leave citizens ill-placed to prioritise the
allocation of new funds. This problem provides an argument in favour of presenting participants
with a menu of well-deﬁned projects to which they can allocate funds, since the project descriptions
will hopefully provide some sense of both volume of activity and likely societal gain. Where this
approach is not taken (perhaps because the PB sponsor wishes not to be so prescriptive), another
option is to provide participants with training designed to familiarise them with the budgeting
process. A third option is to attempt to include the concept of unit cost in the decision-making
process (Research for Today Ltd, n.d.), though to do this makes the process begin to resemble multi-
criteria analysis, with its attendant problems.
Because PB is not inherently deliberative, there is no requirement for participants to reﬂect upon
the choices before them in advance of casting their vote. This can lead to reﬂex voting and/or voting
to serve personal interests (London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 2010). Perhaps in light of this risk,
the Participatory Budgeting Unit ﬁrmly argues that PB must include deliberation (Participatory
Budgeting Unit, 2008, 2009).
PB having been introduced, a variant of it that may serve in tackling climate change is now
discussed.6. Participatory emissions budgeting
6.1. Introduction
In Section 3, a case was made for using citizen participation as a tool in addressing the challenge
of climate change. The required characteristics of a putative method of citizen participation were
discussed in Section 4 in the context of a suitable question on which the participation would be
centred. This led to the identiﬁcation of participatory budgeting as a method of citizen participation
seemingly well suited to the task and PB was then brieﬂy surveyed in Section 5. In this section, the
concept of ‘‘participatory emissions budgeting’’ is introduced and explored.
6.2. The concept
In Section 4.2, discussion of the question to be posed of citizens concluded with a question of the
form ‘‘which measures should we implement?’’ and an accompanying assertion that it would be
preferable for climate change to feature implicitly than explicitly. The concept of participatory
emissions budgeting (PEB) adopts this model in that citizens are invited to make choices about the
allocation of funds to projects. They must carry out this allocation whilst conforming to two
constraints—one ﬁnancial, the other relating to greenhouse gas emissions.
The complex relationship between activities and their associated emissions makes it necessary to
base the exercise on the selection of projects rather than the allocation of funds across budget heads,
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on, say, transport, without being quite speciﬁc about the nature of the investment. But there would be
a need to manage the risk that imposing a ﬁxed menu of projects would engender feelings amongst
participants that they were being denied freedom of choice (as identiﬁed in Section 4.4.1); within reason,
therefore, it should be possible for participants to contribute to the deﬁnition of the project menu.
In order for PEB to achieve the beneﬁts associated with ‘‘classical’’ PB, the menu of projects needs
to reﬂect the general concerns and interests of citizens. This will help to ensure a diverse range of
participants. In particular, it would be unwise for the menu of projects to consist only of climate
change mitigation measures (though mitigation measures may feature in the list as a means of
‘‘buying’’ back emissions to ‘‘spend’’ on other projects).
It seems that some degree of deliberation is necessary if only to demonstrate to the sponsoring
authority that citizens have accepted the rationale for a greenhouse gas emission constraint and are
willing to work within it. Other, instrumental arguments in favour of deliberation could be tested
through varying the extent and nature of deliberation designed into the process.
6.3. Development
There are numerous technical factors involved in developing PEB for implementation. This section
provides a very brief overview. A method for estimating emissions associated with an intervention is required as an input to PEB.
It is likely that a hybrid of the process-based approach and input-output modelling will be most
suitable (Wiedmann, 2009). The development of a suitable method needs to take into account
policy questions such as whether to adopt a territorial- or consumption-based measure (the
presumption being that consumption-based measures are more meaningful) as well as technical
issues such as the management of uncertainty and the extent to which upstream and down-
stream emissions are to be included. Another essential input to the process is a suitable greenhouse gas emission constraint reﬂecting
the issues above and taking into account the ﬁnancial budget and the nature of the projects
available for selection. In order for the policy objectives of PEB to be achieved, it is probably
sufﬁcient for this constraint to be a demanding one (i.e. that it force participants to make difﬁcult
trade-offs between policy outcomes they desire and consequent emissions) without it having to
be precisely consistent with any broader climate change objectives set by the authority. The starting menu of projects needs (as stated in Section 6.2) to address the range of citizen
concerns and wishes but must at the same time be manageable in size. Given the range of
activities within the typical local authority’s purview, this suggests either concentrating on a
single sector (e.g. housing) or accepting that the menu can at best consist of a small sample of
activities the authority could undertake but, in either case, there is scope for regulatory and
charging measures to feature in addition to those based principally on expenditure. Questions of recruitment method, degree of facilitation, nature of information provision,
expression and aggregation of preference (as discussed in Section 4.2.1) need also to be resolved.
7. Discussion and conclusion
A case has been made for developing participatory emissions budgeting as a means of tackling an
apparent stalemate between citizens and their local authorities, a stalemate which may partially
explain both the lack of action on the part of authorities and resistance to change on the part
of citizens. The proposition is that PEB may avoid the pitfalls of orthodox behaviour change
interventions whose top-down nature can engender resentment amongst citizens whilst excusing
sponsoring authorities from having to justify their own actions. Instead, it may create a more
collaborative process based on dialogue in which citizens may come to appreciate the environmental
imperatives, and authority stakeholders may be convinced that there is greater popular acceptance
of pro-environmental measures than they had thought. It is possible that PEB will also lead
participants to make pro-environmental behaviour changes individually.
T. Cohen / Environmental Development 2 (2012) 18–35 33An initial pilot of PEB has been carried out and the tool is now being developed in preparation for
a series of further trials. A thorough evaluation will help to show to what extent the hypotheses
concerning its impacts are borne out in reality. If it proves successful, PEB may become a tool used by
local governments to help make the necessary progress towards major emissions reductions.Acknowledgements
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